Making Coasean Property More Coasean by Merrill, Thomas W. & Smith, Henry E.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2011 
Making Coasean Property More Coasean 
Thomas W. Merrill 
Columbia Law School, tmerri@law.columbia.edu 
Henry E. Smith 
Harvard Law School, hesmith@law.harvard.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Property Law and 
Real Estate Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, JOURNAL OF LAW & 
ECONOMICS, VOL. 54, P. S77, 2011; HARVARD LAW SCHOOL JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECONOMICS & 
BUSINESS DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 688; COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 
11-262 (2011). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2400 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1769243
 1
Columbia Law School 
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group 
 
 





Making Coasean Property More Coasean 
 
Thomas W. Merrill 




Henry E. Smith 
Harvard Law School 
 
February 8, 2011 
 ISSN 1936-5349 (print)  
 ISSN 1936-5357 (online) 
 
HARVARD 










Thomas W. Merrill 













Harvard Law School 






This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
 
The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ 
 
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/ 
 1
MAKING COASEAN PROPERTY MORE COASEAN 
 
Thomas W. Merrill*  
Henry E. Smith** 
 




Abstract:  In his pioneering work on transaction costs, Ronald Coase presupposed a 
picture of property as a bundle of government-prescribed use rights.  This picture is not 
only not essential to what Coase was trying to do, but its limitations emerge when we 
apply Coase’s central insights to analyze the structure of property itself.  This leads to 
what we term the Coase Corollary: in a world of zero transaction costs the nature of 
property does not matter to allocative efficiency.  But as with the Coase Theorem itself, 
the real point is the implication for a positive transaction cost world: we need to subject 
the notion of property to a comparative institutional analysis.  Because transaction costs 
are positive, it is no accident that property is defined in terms of things as a starting point, 
that uses are grouped under exclusion rights, and that in rem rights are widely employed: 
these features of property receive a transaction cost explanation.  Simple lumpy packages 
of property rights motivated by transaction costs form an important baseline that 
furnishes presumptive answers to bilateral use conflicts.  A more thoroughly Coasean 
approach points back to a picture of property more like the traditional one furnished by 
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MAKING COASEAN PROPERTY MORE COASEAN 
 
Thomas W. Merrill*  
Henry E. Smith** 
Ronald Coase has had a profound impact on the study of property rights, more so than 
any other modern thinker.  There is an irony and a paradox in this.  The irony is that 
Coase never intended to have such an impact.  As he has said – most recently in the video 
interview that introduced the Coase Centennial Conference – his scholarly objective was 
to illuminate the impact of the legal system on the working of the economy, not to 
advance our understanding about how economic forces may influence the law.1  The 
paradox concerns the role of Coase’s presuppositions about property.  In his seminal 
writings, Coase assumes a picture of property as ad hoc bundles of government-
prescribed use rights.  This is deeply misleading in critical respects, and out of sync with 
both classical and much contemporary economic thought.  Yet not only is Coase’s picture 
of property not essential to what Coase was trying to do, its limitations emerge when we 
apply Coase’s central insights to analyze the structure of property itself.   
To see how Coasean analysis yields a conception of property at odds with Coase’s 
own picture of property, in Part IV we introduce the Coase Corollary: in a world of zero 
transaction costs, wealth maximization will occur regardless of the nature and scope of 
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of the Research of Ronald Coase at the University of Chicago School of Law, at the the International 
Society for New Institutional Economics, 14th Annual Conference at the University of Stirling, Scotland, 
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property rights.  Like the Coase Theorem itself, the Coase Corollary is a thought 
experiment.  It does not purport to describe the real world, where positive transaction 
costs are pervasive.  In a world of positive transaction costs – in the broadest sense of 
institution costs and not just the costs of exchange – the system of property rights surely 
does matter.  In such a world, a system in which use rights are assigned by the state in an 
ad hoc, resource-by-resource fashion would operate at a severe disadvantage, because of 
the high transaction costs this system would impose on participants in the economy.  By 
contrast, a system in which use rights come in a relatively small number of prescribed 
packages would present significantly lower transaction costs.  In effect, the Coase 
Corollary leads us to a picture of property more like the traditional one furnished by the 
law.   
What is needed to explain the nature of property is no different from what Coase 
advocates more generally for transaction cost economics: comparative institutional 
analysis.  This is the paradox of Coasean property: Coase’s picture of property is not 
what one would expect to find, given a rigorous application of Coase’s own 
methodology.  
I.  COASE’S INFLUENCE ON OUR NOTION OF PROPERTY 
Before we isolate the limits of Coase’s picture of property it is important to 
recognize some of the many ways in which Coase has influenced our understanding of 
property.  A complete catalogue of influences would be nearly impossible.  We will 
highlight five developments in property theory, each of which can be traced to Coase’s 
seminal mid-career work, most importantly The Problem of Social Cost.2  
                                                 
2 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
 
 4
First, Coase’s insight that externalities can be internalized by contractual 
exchanges of property rights formed the foundation of the new institutional approach to 
property rights.  In particular, Harold Demsetz, picking up where Coase left off, 
perceived that externalities can also be internalized by creating new property rights where 
none existed before.3  Coase saw that proposed contracts to modify rights (whether such 
proposals are accepted or rejected) cause actors to take account of how their actions with 
respect to resources impact others; through this process, contractual exchange of rights 
can lead to the use of resources that maximizes social value.  Demsetz saw that new 
arrangements of property rights – especially creating property rights in previously open 
access resources – bring home to owners how their actions with respect to these resources 
affect the valuation that others place on those resources.  The emergence of property 
rights thus tends toward the use of resources that maximizes social value.  This 
Demsetzian variation on the original Coasean logic gave rise to a powerful economic 
theory explaining the evolution of property rights over time.4   
Second, Coase’s emphasis on the importance of transaction costs in determining 
the structure of economic institutions carried with it implications for the protection of 
entitlements.  Very Coasean in spirit is Guido Calabresi’s and Douglas Melamed’s 
landmark distinction between property rules and liability rules as modes of protection of 
property rights.5  Property rule protection permits the transfer of rights only with the 
                                                 
3 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347, 355 (1967) (Papers & 
Proc.). 
 
4 See generally Symposium: The Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S331 et seq. (2002) 
(papers exploring, extending, and critiquing the Demsetzian perspective on the evolution of property 
rights). 
 
5 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1115-17 (1972) 
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consent of the rights holder, typically through voluntary exchange.  Liability rule 
protection permits the transfer of rights without the consent of the rights holder, 
conditioned on the payment of government-determined compensation for the rights taken.  
The principal explanation given by Calabresi and Melamed for the turn to liability rules 
in various contexts was high transaction costs.  That is, when transaction costs make it 
difficult to reallocate entitlements through consensual transactions and/or litigation, this 
supplies a justification for switching from property rule to liability rule protection in 
order to achieve allocative efficiency.6  This is a direct application of Coase’s central 
insight about the critical role of transaction costs, deployed here as an explanation for an 
important feature of the structure of legal rights.   
Third, Coase’s emphasis on the importance of transaction costs in determining 
whether rights will be exchanged stimulated a number of insights into how legal 
institutions are designed to facilitate transactions.  Examples include the use of rules 
rather than standards in defining property rights,7 the use of rectilinear rather than 
meandering property boundaries,8 the adoption of land titling and registration systems,9 
and the importance of the numerus clausus in limiting the number of property forms.10  In 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6 Id. at 1106-07. 
 
7 See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal 
Stud. 13, 16 (1985) (noting that the ad coelum rule for defining rights to land involves “[n]o weighing or 
balancing of costs and benefits,” but rather is “exceptionally simple and exceptionally rigorous” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 
8 See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, forthcoming in Research Handbook on 
the Economics of Property Law (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith, eds., Edward Elgar, forthcoming 
2011). 
 
9 See Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. Econ & Org. 401 (2003). 
 
10 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:  The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1 (2000). 
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each case, the starting point of the inquiry has been the assumption that the ability to 
exchange rights is of central importance to achieving a more efficient use of resources, 
and that this is reflected in the structure of rights.  This starting point in explaining many 
features of the structure of property systems is directly attributable to the Coasean 
perspective.    
Fourth, Coase’s emphasis on the importance of exchange of rights has 
underscored the importance of concentrating ownership of property in a way that 
facilitates transfer.  This has led to a variety of additional insights about the structure of 
rights, such as why rules for establishing original ownership of resources assume a 
winner-take-all form,11 the need for maintenance doctrines that militate against excessive 
fragmentation of rights over time,12 and even the advantages of using trusts in 
transferring property from one generation to the next because legal title is concentrated in 
a single trustee.13   
Fifth, Coase’s insistence on comparing the performance of different institutions in 
regulating externalities, including market transactions and government regulation, has 
grown into the New Institutional Economics (NIE).14  In particular, the Coasean approach 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
11 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1221, 1222-23 (1979); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership , 1 J. Legal Analysis 459, 463 (2009); Henry E. 
Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L J 1742, 1766-
77 (2007); see generally Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2175, 2179 (1997) 
(discussing property’s preference for leaving parties with either the “whole meatball” or “zip”). 
 
12 See Michael Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops 
Innovation, and Costs Lives (2008).  
 
13 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773, 
848-49 (2001). 
 
14 See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 3-4, 11 (1989) (introducing “property 
rights approach”); Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 1 
(1975) (subsuming property rights economics in new institutional economics); see generally Thráinn 
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to institutional analysis has inspired subsequent literature on land use controls15 as well as 
a broader literature about the need for comparative institutional analysis in pursing any 
collective goal.16  In this sense Coase can be said to be the father of comparative 
institutional analysis, at least in the literature inspired by economics. 
Obviously, this is by any measure an extraordinary – indeed a stunning – legacy 
for one thinker.  The focus on externalities, the possibility of reducing externalities 
through exchange of rights, the role of transaction costs in determining the feasibility of 
exchange of rights, and the need for measuring proposals for regulation against the 
benchmark of exchange of rights – these ideas were transformative.  Coase’s cluster of 
ideas, either singularly or in combination, have had a revolutionary impact on our 
collective understanding of property rights.   
II.  COASE’S PICTURE OF PROPERTY 
Throughout his writings, but especially in his highly influential papers on the 
Federal Communications Commission17 and The Problem of Social Cost,18 Coase 
presupposed a particular picture of property – that of property as a bundle of rights, or 
more precisely, as a collection of use rights authoritatively prescribed for each resource 
                                                                                                                                                 
Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions 33 (1990); L.J. Alston, New Institutional Economics, in 6 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 32-37 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 
2008). 
 
15 Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use 
Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681 (1973). 
 
16 Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy 
(1994). 
 
17 R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1959). 
 
18 Coase, supra note 2. 
 
 8
by the state.19  This picture of property is by no means unique to Coase.  Indeed, the idea 
of property as a bundle of government-prescribed use rights was a thoroughly modern 
notion when he wrote his seminal articles.20  
 Before Coase’s time – that is, 100 years ago and more – a different picture of 
property prevailed in legal and economic literature.21  This was the picture of property as 
a kind of mini-sovereignty.  To be an owner, according to this picture, is to be the ruler 
over some thing.  Just as the king was understood to be the ruler of the realm, so the 
owner of property was the ruler over some Blackacre or chattel within the realm.  
William Blackstone, a master synthesizer of conventional wisdom, expressed the idea 
quite directly.  Property, he said, is that “sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right 
of any other individual in the universe.”22 
 The notion of property as a type of sovereignty was an exaggeration, as 
Blackstone himself seems to have been aware.23  Regulation, taxation, and liability for 
                                                 
19 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 Yale 
L.J. 357 (2001).   
 
20 The bundle of rights picture was the overwhelming consensus view among commentators of the mid- to 
late twentieth century.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 26-29 (1977) 
(reporting that the bundle-of-rights conception of property is so pervasive that “even the dimmest law 
student can be counted upon to parrot the ritual phrases on command”); see also infra note 27 and 
accompanying text.  
 
21 Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 360-66, 383-84. 
 
22 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2. 
 
23 See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, Blackstone’s Theory of the “Absolute” Rights of Property, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
67 (1985) (arguing that the quoted passage is inconsistent with the balance of Blackstone’s treatment of 
property); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 Yale. L.J. 601, 604 
(1998) (describing Blackstone’s talk of an exclusive right to property as “a rhetorical figure describing an 
extreme or ideal type rather than reality”); cf. David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 
10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 103 (2009), available at: http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol10/iss1/ 
(arguing that opening passage was an example of a common eighteenth century style of philosophical 
introduction and is inconsistent with focus of main body of Blackstone’s discussion). 
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uses of property that harm others always constrained the discretion of property owners.  
But the picture of property as sovereignty had one great virtue.  It captured the idea that 
property rights are in rem, meaning that property rights create duties of noninterference in 
all persons.   
The distinctive feature of rights in rem is best understood in contrast to rights in 
personam.  In personam rights, such as rights created by contract or by judgment, attach 
to specific individuals and are paired with duties in other specific individuals.  Thus, if A 
promises to deliver widgets to B in return for cash, A and B have specific rights that are 
defined in terms of specific duties that they owe to each other – either to deliver the 
widgets or the cash.  Similarly, if C obtains a restraining order against D, C’s rights to be 
free of interference by D and D’s duties to desist from interfering with C are defined with 
respect to and are specific to each other.   
In rem rights, in contrast, are rights that create duties of noninterference in all 
other persons, not just in specifically identified others.  Individual rights of bodily 
integrity, reputation, and privacy protected by the law of tort are in rem rights in this 
sense.  Similarly, property rights are in rem, in that they create duties of noninterference 
with things marked in conventional ways as being owned, which duties apply as a matter 
of law to all persons.  Thus, if Blackacre is marked as an owned thing – perhaps because 
it has a fence or hedge around it – all other persons are subject to a duty not to invade 
Blackacre without permission of the owner.  This duty applies without regard to who the 
owner of Blackacre happens to be, or the form of ownership in which it is held, or what 
uses the owner has in mind for Blackacre.  Similar legally-imposed duties of 
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noninterference apply to personal property like cars and to intellectual property rights like 
patents and trademarks identified in conventional ways as being owned.    
 The understanding of property as a right in rem creating a duty of noninterference 
in all persons was not unique to Blackstone and his description of property as one 
person’s “sole and despotic dominion” over some thing.  It has been a fixture of all legal 
systems that trace at least part of their heritage to Roman law.  And it can be found in the 
writings of many of the founders of modern economics, including Adam Smith24 and 
Jeremy Bentham.25  
 At about the time Ronald Coase embarked on his academic career, the traditional 
picture of property as a kind of mini-sovereignty came under attack, most notably from a 
group of American academics known as the Legal Realists.26  The Realists offered a 
competing picture of property – that of property as a bundle of rights or sticks.  The idea 
is that property is simply a label attached to a collection of rights and obligations 
associated with particular things.  The number and identity of the sticks varies from thing 
to thing, from place to place, and even from person to person.  The content of the bundle 
is determined collectively, that is, primarily by the state through its laws. 
                                                 
24 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 9-86 (R.L. Meek, et al., eds., 1978) (Report of 1762-3). 
 
25 Jeremy Bentham, The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined 164 (Charles Warren Everett ed., 1945) (noting 
that “[t]o give a man a property” in a thing, there must be “a mandate prohibiting persons at large from 
meddling with it”); see also Jeremy Bentham, Idea of a Complete Law, in Of Laws in General 156, 177-78 
(H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970). 
 
26 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 
809, 839-42 (1935).  The roots of this conception of property can be traced to the work of Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, although he did not use the metaphor of a bundle of sticks.  See Max Radin, A 
Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1141 (1938) (interpreting the Hohfeldian scheme from a legal 
realist’s point of view); Arthur Linton Corbin, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 Yale L.J. 429, 
429 (1922) (“Our concept of property has shifted . . . . ‘[P]roperty’ has ceased to describe any res, or object 




 The Realists’ motivation for advancing the bundle of rights picture was political.27  
The Realists sought to “de-privilege” property as the post-modernists would say – 
“dethrone” might be a more appropriate expression in this context – in order to facilitate 
more extensive collective control over property, especially through programs of 
redistribution.   
But the bundle of rights picture had a side effect, quite possibly unintended, in 
that it obscured the in rem character of property rights.  The mini-sovereign picture puts 
the in rem feature front and center.  Just as everyone in the realm owes a duty of 
obedience to the king, without regard to whether they have personally sworn allegiance to 
the king, so everyone owes a duty of noninterference to the owner of property, whether or 
not any one of them has met the owner or promised to respect the owner’s rights to the 
owned thing.  Also, just as the king has very broad discretionary authority in determining 
what happens in the realm (at least in the days before parliamentary democracy appeared 
on the scene), so the owner of property has very broad discretionary authority in 
determining how owned things are used.   
The bundle of rights picture is not logically incompatible with the understanding 
that property rights are in rem.  But it has a strong tendency to obscure the in rem feature 
of property.   If property rights can be adjusted along countless margins, often in the 
course of the rendering of specific judgments by courts, then it becomes natural to start to 
think of property as a kind of master list of rights and duties set forth by some 
authoritative state institution for each type of property – or indeed for each particular 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire (1998); Thomas C. Grey, The 




parcel of property.  Under the bundle picture, property becomes an elaborate catalogue of 
in personam rights, setting forth what the owner can or cannot do, and concomitantly 
what others can and cannot do, with respect to specific resources, established by the state 
either through legislation or litigation.28   The right-duty relationship no longer runs 
between the owner and “the world,” but between the owner and the state.  
Coase, being a man of his times – and, one might add, being someone with little 
interest in legal concepts29 – wholeheartedly embraced the bundle of rights picture as his 
understanding of property.  Of course, Coase had little sympathy with the Legal Realist 
agenda of enhancing collective control or redistribution of property.  Coase was 
interested in promoting the idea of contractual exchange of rights as an alternative to 
collective regulation.  Nevertheless, he adopted the picture of property as a list of 
permitted and proscribed use rights, imposed by the authoritative institutions of the state.  
In so doing he, like the Realists, obscured the crucial in rem feature of property rights. 
 The evidence for Coase’s embrace of the bundle of rights picture of property is 
based primarily on what Coase says in his seminal 1959 and 1960 articles. We will 
provide here only a few select quotations from those works.  Those interested in a more 
complete documentation of evidence based on these articles should consult an essay we 
wrote that also touches on Coase’s influence on property scholarship.30 
 Consider, first, a passage that appears on the last page of The Problem of Social 
Cost:     
                                                 
28 Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 366. 
 
29 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 2, at 15 (describing the reasoning of the judges in resolving nuisance cases as 
frequently resting on factors that seem “strange to an economist,” such as the doctrine of the lost grant, 
which he says is “about as relevant as the colour of the judge’s eyes”). 
 
30 Merrill & Smith, supra note 19. 
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The rights of a land-owner are not unlimited. It is not even always possible 
for him to remove the land to another place, for instance, by quarrying it. 
And although it may be possible for him to exclude some people from 
using “his” land, this may not be true of others. For example, some people 
may have the right to cross the land. Furthermore, it may or may not be 
possible to erect certain types of buildings or to grow certain crops or to 
use particular drainage systems on the land. This does not come about 
simply because of Government regulation. It would be equally true under 
the common law. In fact it would be true under any system of law. A 
system in which the rights of individuals were unlimited would be one in 
which there were no rights to acquire.31   
 
The conclusion Coase draws from these observations is quite striking: “We may speak of 
a person owning land and using it as a factor of production but what the land-owner in 
fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions.”32  This passage 
rather clearly indicates that Coase understood property not as any distinctive right to a 
thing imposing duties of noninterference on all others, but rather as a bundle or collection 
of rights to carry out or desist from certain actions with respect to resources. 
Even more striking is the discussion in the 1959 article on the Federal 
Communications Commission, which served as a precursor to the more famous article on 
social cost published the next year.  There, Coase was directly concerned with making the 
case for establishing a market in rights to the use of radio spectrum frequencies, or what 
might loosely be termed “spectrum rights.”  The nature of property rights was more 
central to this project than to the more influential article on social cost. 
In making the case for allocating spectrum rights by contract, Coase had to confront 
a variety of arguments to the effect that private property rights in the radio portion of the 
electromagnetic spectrum are too difficult to define and enforce, given the invisible 
                                                 





nature of the resource and our limited understanding of the circumstances in which one 
type of use of the radio spectrum will interfere with another.  Coase sought to address 
these concerns by suggesting that privatization of spectrum rights should proceed not by 
defining exclusive rights in a portion of the “ether” or in particular radio frequencies, but 
rather by specifying use rights in broadcasting equipment. As he summarized his 
position: 
 
What does not seem to have been understood is that what is being 
allocated by the Federal Communications Commission, or, if there were a 
market, what would be sold, is the right to use a piece of equipment to 
transmit signals in a particular way. Once the question is looked at in this 
way, it is unnecessary to think in terms of ownership of frequencies or the 
ether.33   
 
Lest there be any ambiguity about Coase’s preference for defining the proposed 
property rights in terms of permitted uses of broadcasting equipment, he turned 
immediately to certain suggestions that rights to radio spectrum could be determined by 
analogy to air rights over land.  Coase thought that this way of thinking of the problem 
“tends to obscure the question that is being decided.”34  He continued: “[W]hether we 
have the right to shoot over another man’s land has been thought of as depending on who 
owns the airspace over the land. It would be simpler to discuss what we should be 
allowed to do with a gun.”35  Coase’s preference for defining property rights in terms of 
permitted uses was here revealed in the starkest possible terms.  Coase thought it was 
unduly complicated to try to describe a landowner’s rights in terms of a general rule 
                                                 
33 Coase, supra note 17, at 33. 
 





about the right of the owner to exclude intrusions by strangers from a delimited space – 
the traditional in rem approach.  Far better to draw up a list of permissible uses of a gun.   
 Two other features of these articles, especially the 1960 article on the Problem of 
Social Cost, reinforced the list-of-uses or bundle-of-rights picture of property.  First, all 
Coase’s examples involved two-party disputes: ranchers and farmers, doctors and 
confectioners, and so forth.36   This made it more plausible to imagine property as a list of 
use rights freely exchangeable between the parties to any dispute.  Cattle could be 
allowed to trample crops, or cattle could be prohibited from trampling crops – either way 
– and the rancher and farmer would then decide how to reallocate this use right.  Second, 
all of Coase’s examples involved land use incompatibilities, usually incompatibilities 
considered under the rubric of nuisance law.  This made it more plausible to think of use 
rights as being highly mutable.  Had Coase focused on other problems associated with 
ownership, like physical ouster, theft, or state expropriation, this perspective would not 
have seemed so plausible. 
  We now know that Coase’s seminal contributions in his 1959 and 1960 articles 
occurred at the mid-point in his extraordinary career.  Coase’s endorsement of the bundle 
of rights picture of property in these articles would have had little influence on 
subsequent property scholarship if he had recanted this feature of his analysis in later 
writing.  There is, however, no evidence that Coase ever relinquished his attachment to 
                                                 
36 Coase, supra note 2, at 8-10 (discussing Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879), involving a 
confectioner and a doctor).  See also id. at 10-11 (discussing Cooke v. Forbes, L.R. 5 Eq. 166 (1867-68), 
involving a mat weaver and an ammonia manufacturer); id. at 11-13 (discussing Bryant v. Lefever, 4 C.P.D. 
172 (1878-79), involving an owner of a house with timber stacked on the roof and an owner of an adjacent 
house with a smoky chimney); id. at 14 (discussing Bass v. Gregory, 25 Q.B. D. 481 (1890), involving the 
owners of a public house with a brewing vat and an owner of some cottages with a well that served as a 
ventilating shaft for the vat). 
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the bundle of rights picture of property.  In fact, three pieces of evidence from Coase’s 
later writings appear to confirm his lifetime commitment to this viewpoint.  
 Tom Hazlett has suggested in conversation that Coase abandoned the bundle of 
rights picture, and embraced a more conventional in rem conception of property, in a 
draft study he undertook in 1963 for the Rand Corporation on the allocation of the radio 
spectrum.37  Rand commissioned the study to examine how the nascent federal space 
program could acquire sufficient spectrum rights to ensure adequate communications 
between satellites or space craft and ground controllers.  The draft was authored by Coase 
and two Rand economists, William Meckling and Jora Minasian.  The lengthy draft 
covers a variety of topics related to the space communications issue, and includes two 
chapters proposing as a solution to anticipated spectrum shortages that spectrum rights 
should be allocated by market transactions rather than by government fiat.  This of course 
is the proposal advanced by Coase in his 1959 Federal Communications Commission 
article.   
Interestingly, the two chapters set forth two different analyses of how units of 
spectrum rights could be defined as a predicate to establishing a functioning market in 
such rights.  The first chapter suggests that property rights be defined in terms of inputs – 
                                                 
37 Ronald Coase, William H. Meckling, & Jora Minasian, RAND Corporation, Problems of Radio 
Frequency Allocation (RAND unrestricted draft no. DRU-1219-RC, 1995), available at: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/drafts/2008/DRU1219.pdf.  Although the draft study is undated, internal 
evidence suggests it was written in 1963.  The most recent material cited in the draft was published in 1962, 
and it refers to conference held in 1963 in the future tense.  See id. at 11.  For further discussion of the 
Rand study and Coase’s role in the history of allocation of spectrum rights, see Thomas W. Hazlett, David 
Porter, & Vernon L. Smith, Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase, (George Mason 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-18, April 1, 2010; forthcoming, Journal of Law and Economics), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583098. 
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defining the permissible uses of broadcasting equipment.38  This of course is the proposal 
advanced by Coase in his 1959 article.  This chapter was clearly written by Coase.  The 
draft in this chapter refers to the author in the first person as “I,” and introduces a 
quotation from the 1959 article with the phrase, “[a]s I said on a previous occasion. . . .”39  
Not surprisingly, property in this portion of the draft study is treated as a bundle of 
authoritatively prescribed use rights.  For example, the author of this chapter (Coase) says 
at one point: 
We commonly think of the process of allocating radio frequencies as 
being similar to that by which a stone which is extracted from a quarry is 
allocated to various users.  But, in looking at the question this way, we 
tend to forget that the stone can only be used in certain ways.  What the 
owner of a piece of stone can do with it is strictly limited; but what he can 
do with it defines the property rights which adhere to ownership of a piece 
of stone.  And the same would be true for the ownership of radio 
frequencies.40 
 
The draft study also offered, in the next chapter, an “alternative approach” to 
establishing exchangeable rights in spectrum.41  This alternative conception would have 
defined the relevant units to be exchanged in terms of outputs, namely, in reference to a 
particular segment of bandwidth that could be broadcast over a particular area, with the 
owner given a right to exclude all “admissions” by others into this frequency in this area.  
This alternative approach is squarely grounded in a conception of property as an in rem 
right of exclusion – the traditional legal understanding.  The alternative analysis is written 
in an impersonal passive voice, cites primarily technical engineering materials, and 
                                                 
38 Coase, Meckling, & Minasian, supra note 37, at 73-98 (Chapter III: “The Radio Frequency Spectrum as a 
Scarce Resource”). 
 
39 Id. at 94. 
 
40 Id. at 93. 
 
41 Id. at 99-176 (Chapter IV: “Property Rights in Radiation: Alternative Approach”). 
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adopts the style of a professional American academic journal.  It was almost certainly 
written by one of Coase’s co-authors, Jora Minasian, who a decade later published an 
article very close to the “alternative approach” chapter in the Rand study.42   
The evidence from the draft study is admittedly not conclusive about Coase’s 
views on property in the mid-1960s.  The draft does not expressly acknowledge that 
different authors wrote the different chapters, nor does it acknowledge that there was any 
disagreement among the authors about the proper way to conceive of property rights in 
radio frequencies.  Nevertheless, we believe the draft study provides at least 
circumstantial evidence that Coase continued to adhere to his understanding of property 
as a bundle of use rights.  The chapter that adopts the property-as-inputs conception 
refers to the author in the first person as Coase, and clearly rehearses the Coasean view.  
The “alternative approach” grounded in exclusion rights bears no evidence of Coase’s 
style of writing.  It would not be uncommon for three authors of a consulting report to 
“agree to disagree” on a significant point like this by presenting their competing views as 
“alternative” ways of thinking about a problem.  We strongly suspect that is what 
happened in the draft study.     
Perhaps more to the point, even if Coase had experienced a conversion in 1963, 
this would have had little effect on readers of his seminal articles of 1959 and 1960.  The 
draft study was “suppressed” by the Rand Corporation, evidently on the ground that it 
was too controversial.43  Only many years later, in response to increased acceptance of 
                                                 
42 Jora R. Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation: An Alternative Approach to Radio Frequency 
Allocation, 18 J.L. & Econ. 221 (1975). 
 
43 Ronald H. Coase, Comment on Thomas W. Hazlett: Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: 
Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & Econ. 577, 579 (1998). 
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the idea of allocating spectrum rights by market mechanisms, did Rand decide to make 
the study publicly available.44  Even today, however, the draft study is not widely known 
or cited.  Thus, the draft’s implicit disavowal of Coase’s picture of property, at least in its 
discussion of the “alternative approach” to establishing spectrum rights, had little or no 
influence on later development of property theory.   
A second piece of evidence involves Coase’s 1974 article entitled The Lighthouse 
in Economics.45  Coase became interested in lighthouses because they have been widely 
cited in economics texts as an example of a public good that is nonexcludible and 
nonrivalrous, often with the accompanying suggestion that this means lighthouse services 
must be provided by the government and funded out of general tax revenues.  Coase was 
able to show, through an examination of the history of lighthouses in Britain, that 
lighthouses have at some times been built and operated by nongovernmental entities.  
Thus, as Coase correctly concluded, they are not “an example of a service which could 
only be provided by the government.”46   
Coase also thought that his investigations showed that, “contrary to the belief of 
many economists, a lighthouse can be provided by private enterprise.”47  This he surely 
did not do, if by “private enterprise” one means a system of conventional property rights 
to exclude others from lighthouse properties combined with contracts between lighthouse 
                                                 
44 See Coase, Meckling, & Minasian, supra note 37, at iii. 
 
45 R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & Econ. 357 (1974). 
  
46 Id. at 376. 
 
47  Id. at 375. 
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owners and ships.48  If this had been the full extent of the rights of private lighthouse 
owners, they would have had no practical way of excluding noncontracting ships from 
benefitting from the information supplied by lighthouse beacons.  Freeriding would likely 
be rampant, and private lighthouses would likely go out of business.  
Private entities were able to survive in the lighthouse business only because they 
were given an additional property right by the government: the right to exclude ships 
from British ports unless the ships paid lighthouse tolls to customs officers, who in turn 
passed on a portion of the tolls to the operators of lighthouses.49  In other words, 
lighthouse owners were given a separate and distinct property right to exclude vessels 
stopping at British ports from using the information supplied by the lighthouse without 
paying a fee.  This separate right, analogous to an intellectual property right, is what 
made the provision of lighthouse services by private entities possible.50 
What are we to make of the fact that Coase misidentified the relevant property 
right that made the provision of lighthouse services by private entities possible?  This 
does not necessarily prove that he continued to think of property as a bundle of use rights.  
Nevertheless, there is, again, circumstantial evidence supporting such an inference.  
Coase at one point makes the remarkable claim about the provision of lighthouse services 
by “private enterprise” that:  
[t]he role of the government was limited to the establishment and 
enforcement of property rights in the lighthouse.  The charges were 
                                                 
48 See David E. Van Zandt, The Lessons of the Lighthouse: “Government” or “Private” Provision of 
Goods, 22 J. Legal Stud. 47 (1993). 
 
49 See Elodie Bertrand, The Coasean Analysis of Lighthouse Financing: Myths and Realities, 30 Cambridge 
J. Econ. 389, 396-97 (2006); Van Zandt, supra note 48, at 54-57, 64-69. 
 
50 A lighthouse owner also needed the Crown’s authorization in order to have the right to enforce the 
payment of light dues.  Bertrand, supra note 49, at 397. 
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collected at the ports by agents for the lighthouses.  The problem of 
enforcement was no different for them than for other suppliers of goods 
and services to the shipowner.  The property rights were unusual only in 
that they stipulated the price that could be charged.51   
 
This passage makes sense only if Coase believed that the “property rights in the 
lighthouse” could be expanded by the government to include the right to receive a portion 
of the tolls collected by customs officers from ships using nearby ports.  In other words, 
the bundle of rights associated with owning a tower with a light on top can be modified 
by the state by adding the right to receive a stream of revenues collected by the 
government from third parties.   
This is at a minimum an unconventional way of describing property rights.  We 
do not ordinarily say that the property right of homeowners includes the right to deduct 
mortgage interest payments from income taxes the homeowner may owe the government, 
or that the property right of grocers in foodstuffs includes the right to redeem foodstamps 
collected from patrons in exchange for those foodstuffs.  One can of course adopt this 
locution if one embraces the bundle of rights conception of property.  But one would not 
ordinarily speak of property rights as including the prospect of side payments from the 
government based on understandings that vary widely with the circumstances of each 
individual owner.   
Notice in this respect that the specific deal offered by the government to each 
private lighthouse operator was highly idiosyncratic – different tolls were charged in 
different ports for different types of ships, the length of the agreement between the 
lighthouse operator and the government varied from lighthouse to lighthouse, and so 
forth.  If all these variations are included in the concept of property, then property rights 
                                                 
51 Coase, supra note 45, at 375. 
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must be envisioned as a complex of in personam rights prescribed by the state, not 
standardized rights imposing duties of noninterference on all actors.  We would conclude, 
therefore, that the Lighthouse article, at least implicitly, reflects a continuation of Coase’s 
commitment to the bundle of rights picture of property.    
A third piece of evidence suggesting that Coase never relinquished the bundle of 
rights picture of property is a book he published in 1988 reproducing his leading articles, 
including the Problem of Social Cost and The Lighthouse in Economics.52   The book 
includes an introduction, in which Coase set forth his understanding of the linkages 
between these articles.  In explaining the connection between the 1959 and 1960 articles, 
he returned once again to the nature of property rights.  After reiterating his proposal to 
allocate rights to use the radio spectrum by market exchange, he continued as follows: 
I went on to discuss what rights would be acquired by the successful 
bidder, a question which economists, thinking as they do of factors of 
production as physical units (tons of fertilizer, acres of land, etc.), usually 
take for granted.  Lawyers, however, habitually think of what is bought 
and sold as consisting of a bundle of rights.  It is easy to see why I was led 
to adopt the same approach in dealing with the radio frequency spectrum, 
since it is difficult to treat the use of the right to emit electrical radiation 
solely in physical terms, particularly since what can be achieved by 
emitting electrical radiations on a given frequency depends crucially on 
what use of this and adjacent frequencies is being made by others.  It is 
impossible to think concretely about what would be paid for the use of an 
particular frequency unless there has been some specification of the rights 
possessed by all the people who use this and adjacent frequencies or who 
might use them. . . . 
 
 There is no difficulty in employing the same approach which I 
found useful in discussing the allocation of the radio frequency spectrum 
for the analysis of problems which economists are more accustomed to 
handle.  Someone having the right to build a factory on a piece of land 
(and wishing to exercise that right) would normally also secure the right to 
prevent someone else from, say, planting wheat on it; and if the operation 
of the factory created noise or led to the emission of smoke, the factory-
                                                 
52 Coase, supra note 1. 
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owner would wish to have the right to do this.  The factory-owner would 
chose to use a particular site and create noise and emit smoke because this 
would produce a higher net income than alternative sites or modes of 
operation.  Exercise of these rights would, of course, deny the use of the 
land to agriculturalists and clean air to others. . . . 
 
 What this approach makes clear is that there is no difference, 
analytically, between rights such as those to determine how a piece of land 
should be used and those, for example, which enable someone in a given 
location to emit smoke.53  
 
Here we find Coase explicitly endorsing the bundle of rights conception, and explicitly 
extending it from property rights in unusual resources like the radio spectrum to 
conventional rights in land.  Some of his language even goes so far as to suggest there is 
no standard default bundle of land ownership, but merely ad hoc collections of use rights, 
assembled one tract at a time.  Thus, for example, he says that someone buying land for a 
factory “would normally also secure the right to prevent someone else from, say, planting 
wheat on it.”54  We seriously doubt that Coase entertained the notion that property rights 
are purely ad hoc assemblages of rights and privileges, like ingredients at a Mongolian 
barbecue restaurant.  More likely he should be understood as saying that the common law 
has defined certain default package of use rights associated with land, which in the 
ordinary case would include the right to build a factory and to exclude someone else who 
wanted to use the land to plant wheat.  But clearly he conceived of each use right as 
contingent on the evolved state of the law, and as freely exchangeable through 
contracting.  This is the bundle of rights picture of property.   
                                                 
53 Id. 11-12 (emphasis added). 
 
54 Id. at 11. 
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III.  PROPERTY AS AN IN REM RIGHT  
As should be obvious from the many examples of influence we cited in Part I, 
Coase’s picture of property did not inhibit rapid progress in the development of the 
economic analysis of property.  Nevertheless, we will argue that Coase’s picture of 
property had a distorting influence, and in certain respects may have impeded intellectual 
progress in developing our understanding of the institution of property.  
Notwithstanding the impressive payoffs from Coase’s work, the list-of-uses 
conception of property implicit in his articles also had its costs.  The picture of property 
as an ever-mutable bundle of rights has long blinded economic scholars to the in rem 
features of property, which means that they have ignored or downplayed certain 
dimensions of any system of property rights.  We will mention three key implications that 
flow from the in rem understanding of property that were long overlooked in the wake of 
Coase. 
First, the bundle of rights picture fails to capture the centrality of exclusion rights 
to the institution of property.  Because the owner has the right to exclude the world, the 
owner assumes the role of gatekeeper or manager of the asset.55  This means, among 
other things, that the owner has a powerful incentive to invest in and develop the asset, 
because the owner will capture the benefit of these actions as the residual claimant.56  
                                                 
55 See, e.g., J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 29-30, 71 (1997); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and 
the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730, 739 (1998); Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of 
Property, 1 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 69, 78-79 (2005). 
 
56 See, e.g., Barzel, supra note 14, at 3-4 (introducing theory in which the notion of rights “is closely related 
to that of residual claimancy,” and the notion of property rights “is closely related to that of transaction 
costs,” because the residual claimant enjoys attributes of assets that cannot be captured in contracts due to 
transaction costs.); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972) (describing the residual claimant as one with incentives to 
reduce shirking and with the most significant management potential). 
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Thus, exclusion accounts for the dynamic efficiency of property, as opposed to the 
allocational efficiency that comes from the free exchange of rights.  Under the bundle of 
rights picture, in contrast, the exclusion right fades into the background as part of the 
general bundle of sticks, no more important than the right to inherit or the right to use the 
asset for particular purposes.   
Second, the bundle of rights picture fails to highlight the enormous information 
cost constraints associated with any system of in rem rights.  This is most pronounced if 
we think about the situation of potential violators of in rem rights.57  If everyday property 
– rights to land and chattels – entails rights to exclude all the world from some thing, this 
sets up a potentially severe information cost problem for potential violators of these 
rights.  The costs of communicating information about rights and duties in a world that 
consists solely of in personam or A-to-B rights would be significant.  Each person would 
have to be aware of and comprehend all the obligations that they had personally 
undertaken or that had been imposed upon them.  The costs of communicating 
information about in rem rights and duties which apply to “everyone” are potentially 
much greater.  If every property right was described by a customizable list of permitted 
uses – as Coase imagined with respect to stones from different quarries or individual 
British lighthouses – and these rights had to be understood and respected by all the world, 
the resulting information costs would be staggering.     
This in turn suggests that the messages about everyday property must be very 
simple – messages like “keep off” or “don’t touch” – couched in concepts readily 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 10, at 8; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of 
Property, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1849, 1850, 1854 (2007); Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: 
Form, Context, and Audience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1146-47 (2003).  
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comprehensible to remote people with little special legal or asset-specific information.58  
It also suggests that the signaling mechanisms for delineating the boundaries of property 
must be easily observable and comprehensible, things like fences and hedge rows that 
mark the edges of land ownership.59  The bundle of rights conception obscures the need 
for communication to potential violators on a mass scale, and thus suggests that property 
rights are much more malleable than we observe them in actual practice to be.   
Even if we confine ourselves to potential transactors in property rights – the more 
common Coasean perspective – the in rem nature of property also underscores the need to 
communicate with a large potential audience.60  The types of transactions emphasized by 
Coase – agreements between two neighbors to modify entitlements in order more 
efficiently to manage spillover effects – are relatively rare.  Much more common are 
outright purchases, leases, licenses, and lending of all stripes and varieties.  In order for 
the potential parties to these transactions to make judgments about who owns what, it is 
necessary that the available forms of property and conventions about the respective 
priorities of different lenders be significantly standardized.  Standardization to the degree 
necessary for random potential violators is not necessary.  But free customization of 
interests between A and B would be unacceptable, because this would create an 
                                                 
58 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1328-29 (1993) (noting that fences 
and other boundary markers are more readily apparent to outsiders than a group’s internal work rules); 
Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 388-94 (discussing simplicity of messages about property to dutyholders 
in the context of social norms and causation of harm); Smith, supra note 57, at 1116-17; see also Carol M. 
Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 Duke L.J. 
1, 18-20 (contrasting “KEEPOUT” and “RIGHTWAY” strategies in terms of administrative costs). 
 
59 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of 
Ownership 267-304 (1994); Robert C. Ellickson, The Inevitable Trend Toward Universally Recognized 
Signals of Property Claims: An Essay for Carol Rose (Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 415, 
Oct. 28, 2010; forthcoming, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1699427; Smith, supra note 57, at 1115-25, 1174-75. 
 
60 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 10, at 24-42; Smith, supra note 57, 1139-67. 
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informational externality for other potential transactors.  The added informational burden 
would affect not only future transactors in the property transferred from A to B, but all 
potential transactors who would have to be on the lookout for deviant forms of property 
or security interests in unrelated transactions.61   
One might think that land records would obviate the need for standardization.62 
But cross-country empirical work on land records suggests that land records and 
standardization are to some extent complements: more definitive land records that 
guarantee title tend to have a stricter numerus clausus, allowing fewer property forms, 
apparently because the registrar of titles stands in for the public as the “audience” for 
rights and cannot be expected to pass judgment on all sorts of idiosyncratic rights.63  By 
contrast, the bundle of rights picture emphasizes the plasticity and variety of packages of 
property rights.  Again, the bundle of rights picture of property obscures the need for this 
degree of standardization of rights. 
Third, the in rem nature of property rights renders implausible one of the principal 
claims of Coase’s 1960 article, which is that the problem of social cost is reciprocal in 
nature, and thus it is not useful to speak of one party to an externality as being “the 
                                                 
61 Merrill & Smith, supra note 10, at 26-27, 31-33; Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law, in 
Research Handbook on the Economics of Property Law 20-34 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith, eds., 
Edward Elgar, forthcoming, 2011). 
 
62 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1353 (1982); see also Alfred F. Conard, Easement Novelties, 30 Cal. L. Rev. 125, 131-33 (1942) 
(arguing that the enforcement of easements should not be objectionable on grounds of novelty as long as 
there is notice).  Henry Hansmannn and Reinier Kraakman fall into this trap when their assertion that 
recording removes reasons for standardization leads them to claim – erroneously – that the numerus clausus 
has no basis in common law.  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: 
The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S373, S416-17 (2002). 
 
63 See Arruñada, supra note 9, at 1416-20. 
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cause” of any problem of incompatible demands on resources.64  Lawyers have always 
had trouble accepting this claim, offering counterexamples such as A’s fist striking B’s 
nose.65  The idea of reciprocal causation is not strictly speaking entailed by the bundle of 
rights picture of property.  One could theoretically retain the idea of asymmetric 
causation with respect to (some at least) of the uses included within the bundle.  Once we 
recognize the in rem nature of rights in property and bodily integrity, however, the idea 
of reciprocal causation is not just a contingent feature of the legally sanctioned bundle, it 
becomes utterly implausible.   
Rights good against the world have a built-in asymmetry.  We could imagine 
solving questions of resource use pairwise between everyone: A versus B, A versus C, B 
versus C, and so on.  But many of the various combinations would never be used, making 
A versus everyone else a reasonable first approximation.  And A versus everyone else is 
asymmetric: the class of everyone else is almost inevitably much larger and more 
indefinite than the class that includes just A.  Consider the rights to use a car.  If A has 
the right and can exclude all others, then it is clear that anyone else who wants to use the 
car must strike a deal with A.  The costs of transactions under such an arrangement are 
manageable.  But if all the world has the right to use the car, then if A wishes to use the 
car for any period of time, A will have to strike a deal with all the world.66  The costs of 
entering into transactions under this allocation of rights are extremely large – indeed 
potentially infinite.  If we say that the difference between these two arrangements 
                                                 
64 Coase, supra note 2, at 2, 8-15, 37.  
 
65 See, e.g., Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law Thought, 56 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 711, 724-25 (1983) (ascribing this resistance to psychological differences between 
economic and common-law conceptions of causation). 
 
66 See, e.g., Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. Legal Stud. 321 (1985).  
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disappears if we assume zero transaction costs, then this significantly undermines the 
heuristic value of the assumption of zero transaction costs, since the transaction costs 
differ enormously depending on the assignment of rights. 
Is the basic package of rights associated with the in rem picture of property a 
mystification or legal irrelevancy, like the color of the judge’s eyes?67  Our answer is no, 
and that answer relates back to the Coase Theorem, but in a more thoroughgoing way 
than envisioned by Coase.  It is time to turn the Coasean spotlight back on the picture of 
property as a bundle of sticks.    
IV.  PROPERTY AND THE COASE COROLLARY 
Not only was Coase’s picture of property wholly tangential to the major 
contributions that have flowed from his pathbreaking work, it was inconsistent with the 
main tenor of his work.  Although Coase aimed to show the influence of the legal system 
on the workings of the economic system, his framework, as we have seen, has been 
immensely fruitful as a tool of institutional analysis.  In this spirit we apply Coase’s 
framework to the notion of property itself – an important legal and economic institution if 
ever there was one. 
Coase did not present his work in The Problem of Social Cost as a theorem, but 
starting with George Stigler in the mid 1960’s, Coase’s argument that in a zero 
transaction cost world people will always reach the wealth-maximizing result through 
contracting (or other equally costless institutional responses) has come to be known as 
the “Coase Theorem.”68  Coase much later summarized his article as “show[ing] . . . that, 
                                                 
67 See supra note 29. 
  
68 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 113 (3d ed. 1966) (stating Coase Theorem as proposition that 
“under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal”). 
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in the absence of transaction costs, it does not matter what the law is, since people can 
always negotiate without cost to acquire, subdivide, and combine rights whenever this 
would increase the value of production.”69  The point of the exercise was to show the 
importance of transaction costs in the real world of positive social costs.  Far from 
endorsing a view of the world based on an assumption of zero transaction costs, Coase’s 
aim was a nearly the opposite.  As he wrote: 
The world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasean world.  
Nothing could be further from the truth.  It is the world of modern economic 
theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave.70 
 
By pointing out the strangeness of the proposition that the “legal position” is irrelevant to 
the pattern of production, Coase was highlighting the importance of transaction costs to 
institutional design. 
 The relevant institutions go far beyond the thin question of who, as between a pair 
of actors, will be liable for an activity involving a resource conflict.71  One critical 
institution is the firm.  Firms are economic institutions, which because of Coase’s work 
we now see as explained by transaction costs.  Coase himself saw that what came to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
69 Coase, supra note 1, at 14.  On how Coase assumes away strategic behavior, see, e.g., Robert Cooter, The 
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71 On the bilateral approach to liability, see, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis 135-73, 261-63 (1970); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict 
Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972); Demsetz, supra note 69, at 27-28. 
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known as the Coase Theorem is closely related to his earlier work on the theory of the 
firm.72  In that article Coase showed that the boundary of the firm can only be explained 
by the relative costs of carrying out transactions within the firm (by fiat) and outside the 
firm in the market (by market contracting).  In other words, “in the absence of transaction 
costs, there is no basis for the existence of firms.”73 
 Another critical institution is property itself.  We have property and endow it with 
a basic architecture of exclusion rules supplemented by rules and standards governing 
proper use, precisely because of transaction costs.  The term “transaction costs” in a sense 
replicates some of the hidden bias towards contracts and away from property in Coase’s 
seminal work.  The term “transaction costs” can be taken narrowly or broadly.74  For 
institutional analysis – or in other words “transaction cost economics” – the frictions 
captured by the term “transaction costs” go beyond the costs of exchange in the sense of a 
quid pro quo.  Coase was preoccupied the costs of exchange of rights, and treated 
transaction costs as the resources that must be expended “to discover who it is that one 
wishes to deal with . . . and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a 
bargain, to draw up a contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the 
terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.”75  But transaction costs also include 
other costs of institutions.  Most relevant for us are all the resources that must be 
expended in order to determine what is being exchanged – the costs of delineating, 
                                                 
72 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937). 
 
73 Coase, supra note 1, at 14. 
 
74 See Douglas W. Allen, What Are Transaction Costs?, 14 Res. L. & Econ. 1 (1991) (arguing that 
transaction costs are better defined as the costs of establishing property rights, in the economist’s sense of a 
de facto ability to derive utility from an action, rather than narrowly as the costs of exchange). 
 
75 Coase, supra note 2 at 15. 
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understanding, and enforcing rights to particular resources.  Some or all of these costs 
have variously gone under the headings of entitlement determination costs,76 information 
costs,77 measurement costs,78 and institution costs.79  Although it is true that in analyzing 
particular institutions, it is necessary to be clear on which “transaction costs” are actually 
in play,80 we will employ the Coasean term “transaction costs” in order to explore the 
implications of Coase’s work – but on the understanding that transaction costs include 
these other costs of a system of property rights and alternative institutional arrangements. 
Once we recognize that property is an institution shaped by positive transaction 
costs in this broad sense, we come to what we dub the Coase Corollary: 
Coase Corollary: In a world of zero transaction costs, wealth maximization will 
occur regardless of the nature and scope of property rights. 
 
The intuition behind the Coase Corollary is straightforward, and directly parallels the 
intuition behind the Coase Theorem.  In a world of zero transaction costs, it would not 
matter whether property rights are broad or narrow, clear or ambiguous – or in rem or in 
personam.  For example, it would not matter if the boundary of land is marked by precise 
lines, or if the boundary is fuzzy and use rights are determined through case-by-case 
                                                 
 
76 See Merrill, supra note 7, at 20-26 (distinguishing between transaction costs and entitlement 
determination costs).   
 
77 See, e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 56; Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & 
Econ. 141, 148 (1979) (noting three classes of “search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, 
policing and enforcement costs . . .[which] reduce to a single one . . . [the] resources losses due to lack of 
information.”); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961). 
 
78 Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & Econ. 27 (1982); see also 
Barzel, supra note 14. 
 
79 Steven N.S. Cheung, The Transaction Costs Paradigm, 36 Econ. Inquiry 514, 515 (1998) (“‘Transaction 
costs’ must be defined to be all the costs which do not exist in a Robinson Crusoe economy.”); Henry E. 
Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 445, 447 (2008).  
 
80 Cf. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1661, 1674-76 (1989) (noting 
widely divergent definitions of “transaction costs” and warning of dangers of tautology in in broad 
definitions for the Coase Theorem). 
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balancing of the needs of rival claimants.  Nor would it matter if property rights were 
standardized (as in the numerus clausus), or if idiosyncratic rights were allowed to 
proliferate.  Either way, as long as transaction costs are zero, the respective rights of all 
affected parties will be instantly and costlessly ascertained.  Similarly, it does not matter 
if property can be held in only one form – say, the fee simple absolute – or if each item of 
property has its own unique set of attributes.  Either way, as long as transaction costs are 
zero, all affected parties can either instantly and costlessly generate new forms (if there 
are not enough) or can instantly and costlessly communicate about and understand the 
forms that do exist (if there are infinitely many). 
Indeed, in a zero transaction cost world, it would not matter whether we had 
anything like property law at all.81  We could, instead, just as easily regard “property” as 
being the solution of all pairwise conflicts between members of society with respect to 
each potential resource conflict – the most extreme bundle of rights picture of property 
imaginable.  The delineation, understanding, and enforcement of these highly atomized 
rights would cost no more than a system in which rights were understood as having a 
standardized form and as imposing duties of respect on all persons.  And, as we saw 
earlier, the highly atomized list of uses approach to property is Coase’s picture of 
property.82   
But as with the Coase Theorem, the lesson of the Coase Corollary is to subject the 
notion of property to comparative institutional analysis, and it is here that we argue that 
                                                 
81 Steven Cheung recognized that a thoroughgoing version of the zero transaction cost assumption would 
remove the need for property rights at all.  See Cheung, supra note 79, at 518-20.  Coase has agreed in 
principle with this observation.  See Coase, supra note 1, at 14-15.   
   
82 See also Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 385 (noting that for Coaseans “[p]roperty rights are simply 
‘entitlements,’ little empty boxes filled with a miscellany of use rights that operate in the background of a 
world consisting of nothing but in personam obligations”). 
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the extreme bundle picture of property comes up far short.  Indeed, this hyper-Realist 
picture is plausible (much less realistic) only in a zero transaction cost world – the world 
Coase tried to persuade economists to leave.  
In our positive transaction cost world, the lumpy, in rem property rights are no 
accident precisely because they save on delineation, understanding, and enforcement 
costs.  Further, in our positive transaction cost world one should expect to find a 
significant degree of standardization of rights, precisely because this would save on 
delineation, understanding, and enforcement costs.  This is not to say that rights will be 
maximally standardized.  There is an inevitable tradeoff between the reduction of 
information costs through standardization of rights and the need for flexibility in offering 
a variety of options in terms of how entitlements are delineated and defined.83  Still, the 
exploration of a zero transaction cost world makes clear what we would otherwise miss 
because it is so obvious: that property rights assume the form they do in significant part 
in order to conserve on transaction costs.  Nothing could be more Coasean.  Despite not 
being Coase’s picture of property, this more realistic picture is the result of applying the 
true Coase Theorem back on the notion of property itself. 
 Such an exercise is no mere theoretical curiosity.  The Coase Corollary sheds light 
on some of the very questions that Coase addressed in his articles.  Take the problem of 
spillovers that Coase illustrated with nuisance cases.84 When deciding a nuisance case, 
we are not writing on a blank slate and are not really asking judges to engage in a cost-
benefit analysis.  Coase may be right that the ultimate question is who gets to do what 
                                                 
83 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 10 (emphasizing the need for optimal, rather than maximal, 
standardization of property forms). 
  
84 Coase, supra note 2, at 8-10. 
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and that this determines the value of production.  But because of transaction costs we 
delegate to owners a range of sovereign authority over their property, with a presumptive 
right to repel invasions through some combination of self-help and litigation (or its 
threat).  This view of nuisance is more realistic than Coase’s, because a truly universal ex 
post balancing test for resource conflict would be prohibitively costly. 
 This not to say that owners always win.  For one thing, the sovereignty afforded 
owners through the exclusion strategy is only a starting point.  The presumption that 
owners can veto invasions sometimes gives way – to the need for airplane overflights and 
antidiscrimination law, to take two examples.85  And sometimes owners will not be able 
to shut down activities emitting sound or odors – for example, if the locality is 
characterized by such activities.86  In other situations, owners may be relegated to a 
remedy of damages rather than an injunction.87  These questions too all turn in part on 
considerations of transaction costs – both the entitlement determination and processing 
costs and the (narrower) transaction costs associated with potential exchanges.88  But 
                                                 
 
85 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 9-15 (2007) (airplane 
overflights); id. at 456-80 (antidiscrimination law); see also Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect 
Relation between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 959 (2009). 
 
86 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 
1920, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1101, 1159-60, 1160 n.126 (1986). 
 
87 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
 
88 The mainstream position in law and economics endorses the sift to damages in large numbers situations 
in order to prevent holdouts.  See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 170-80 (1988); 
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 16, 68-71, 79-81 (5th ed. 1998); Calabresi & Melamed, 
supra note 5, at 1106-10; Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 
73 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 26-27 (1985); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting 
Entitlements: Property Rights, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4 (1979); 
A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage 
Remedies, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1075, 1076 (1980); but see Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, 
Efficiency, and Nuisance Law, in Property Law and Legal Education: Essays in Honor of John E. Cribbet 
7, 7-8 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988) (arguing the result in Boomer rests on an 
underestimation of damages and lack of attention to ex ante incentives); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and 
 36
analyzing these important use conflicts from a transaction cost point of view should not 
obscure the important starting point: for transaction cost reasons we start with sovereign 
owners exercising the right to exclude over clearly delineated things, and we use this 
starting point to resolve a wide range of resource conflicts. 
The Coase Corollary also calls into question aspects of Calabresi and Melamed’s 
Coase-inspired analysis of property rules and liability rules.89  As one of us has written, 
Calabresi and Melamed’s assumption of a thin notion of entitlement is essential to the 
“symmetry” result in their framework.90  But the thin notion of entitlement, drawn as it is 
from Coase and the zero transaction cost world, breaks down in the face of the need for 
significant standardization of rights in our positive transaction cost world.91  If A is 
sending emissions from A’s land to B’s land, we are not in a position to be as agnostic 
about the direction of causation as we might be in a zero transaction cost world.  Even the 
law of nuisance takes the right to be free from a wide range of invasions into the owner’s 
column of space as the starting point.92  This principle of owner entitlement saves on 
delineation costs, as opposed to the thin set of sticks in a giant list of use conflicts.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va. L. Rev. 965, 1037-45 (2004) (arguing for stronger but 
rebuttable presumption for injunctions in nuisance cases based on information cost advantages of property 
rules). 
 
89 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5. 
 
90 Smith, supra note 55, at 70-76 (arguing that entitlements do not actually show the degree of symmetry 
suggested by a traditional law and economics approach). 
 
91 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 Yale L.J. 1400, 1404 n.10 (2007); Frank I. 
Michelman, There Have To Be Four, 64 Md. L. Rev. 136, 147-52 (2005) (discussing asymmetries in 
“remedial entailments” in the Calabresi and Melamed framework); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three’s a Crowd: 
A Feminist Critique of Calabresi and Melamed’s One View of the Cathedral, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 394, 433-
35 (1999); Smith, supra note 88, at 1019-21; Smith, supra note 55, at 72-76. 
 
92 For recent analyses from a variety of perspectives that try to bring the more traditional invasion-based 
test back to the fore, see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its 
Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49, 53-65 (1979); J.E. Penner, Nuisance and the Character of the 
Neighbourhood, 5 J. Evtl. L. 1, 14-25 (1993); Smith, supra note 88, at 992-96; Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson 
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So if under Rule 1 the resident has the entitlement to be free from pollution 
protected by a property rule (injunction) and under Rule 2 has the entitlement protected 
by a liability rule – meaning that the polluter can pollute and pay officially determined 
damages – the question arises what it would mean to “flip things around.”  Calabresi and 
Melamed believe that, in accord with Coasean causal symmetry, the polluter could be 
given the “entitlement” and then we face a parallel choice between protecting that 
entitlement with a property rule (Rule 3) or a liability rule (Rule 4).  What they envision 
is a situation in which the factory owner can pollute but the resident cannot get a remedy, 
thus forcing the resident to pay the polluter if the pollution is to stop.93  But this is not 
truly parallel or symmetric to the Rule 1 situation.94  If it were, then the factory owner 
would have a right to pollute.  If the resident puts up a giant fan and blows the pollution 
back, can the polluter get an injunction?  If not, there is no “right” to pollute but rather an 
ability to get away with it.  As part of the default package of property rights no one has 
the right to pollute in this robust sense (entailing a right to enjoin fans).  The factory 
owner could have a right to pollute if it has an easement (by grant or prescription), which 
might give it the right to enjoin fans, but this is an add-on to the baseline default package 
of rights in land.  When it comes to the resource conflict there is an entitlement structure 
in place and it breaks the symmetry that Calabresi and Melamed are relying on.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property Rights (George Mason Law & 
Economics Research Paper No. 08-20, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1117999. 
 
93 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1116. 
 
94 Smith supra note 55, at 74-76. 
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Much the same can be said about Rule 4.95  Although there is a rationale in some 
situations of undue hardship to soften the remedy from injunctions to damages (Rule 1 to 
Rule 2), there is no parallel rationale from moving from Rule 3, which only exists in the 
specific context of an easement, to Rule 4, by allowing residents to shut down pollution 
on paying damages.  This may be one reason why Rule 4 is almost unheard of in the 
nuisance context.96  Again, the baselines that get in the way of both the Realists’ (and 
Coase’s) bundle-of-sticks entitlements and Coasean causal symmetry stem from the 
institutional analysis called for by the Coase Corollary: we don’t proceed in the agnostic 
bundle-of-sticks fashion because of transaction costs. 
 Relatedly, the need for significant standardization of rights as a response to 
positive transaction costs also helps explain why Coase’s view of causation as reciprocal 
– what we have called Coasean causal agnosticism – does not carry over from the zero 
transaction cost world into our world of positive transaction costs.97  Once we have a 
system of in rem property rights in place it makes no sense to be causally agnostic, for 
transaction cost reasons.  If A’s action causes particles or waves to travel over the 
boundary and into B’s column of space, the presumptive answer is that A is harming B 
                                                 
95 Smith, supra note 88, at 1007-21; see also Smith, supra note 55, at 74-75.  
 
96 The one, heavily rehearsed, case is Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700, 
708 (Ariz. 1972) (en banc).  Another reason for the rarity of rule 4 is that it requires collecting potential 
plaintiffs to avoid freerider problems, as for example in a class action.  In Spur, the developer, who made 
the decision to build close to the feedlot, was the one suing rather than the residents, but to the extent that 
this matters to courts, developers will try to avoid being the plaintiff in the future. 
 
97 Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 391-94. 
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and not vice versa.  Conventional in rem property rights are not the only source of 
baseline entitlements,98 but they are a wholesale source of them.   
 This lack of symmetry is also at the root of the “gravitational” pull that the ad 
coelum rule exerts in many contexts.99  Even in situations governed by social norms we 
find that norms based on the ad coelum approach are more widespread than a comparison 
of values of the conflicting activities would warrant.  Thus in the prototypical Coasean 
example of wandering cattle and trampled crops,100 cattle have to be significantly more 
important than crops to flip from fencing in (rancher liability) to fencing out (rancher 
nonliability).101  Even norms tend to track the ad coelum rule, with fencing in norms 
being more widespread than one would expect on an approach of choosing the more 
valuable activity for the immediate area.102   
Likewise, general norms of possession seem to form powerful defaults: in the law 
of possession, certain control over a thing is a default requirement unless an important 
resource clearly cries out for different treatment.  Robert Ellickson found a pattern of 
                                                 
98 Another source is custom.  For a discussion of custom as a baseline including for the famous cedar-apple 
rust situation of Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), see Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in 
Property, 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 5 (2009), available at: 
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol10/iss1/; see also William A. Fischel, The Law and Economics of 
Cedar-Apple Rust: State Action and Just Compensation in Miller v. Shoene, 3 Rev. L. & Econ. 133, 149-51 
(2007). 
 
99 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 388-91.  The full statement of the maxim is cujus est solum, ejus 
est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (whoever owns the soil owns also to the sky and to the depths).  The 
maxim is routinely followed in resolving issues about ownership of air rights, building encroachments, 
overhanging tree limbs, mineral rights, and so forth, and is subject to certain limited exceptions for airplane 
overflights, for example.  See Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 110, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Merrill, supra 
note 7, at 6-35. 
 
100 Coase, supra note 2, at 2-8. 
 
101 Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 390-91. 
 
102 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes at 52-53, 72-76 (1991) 
(noting widespread use of an informal norm of animal-owner responsibility); Merrill & Smith, supra note 
19, at 388-91 (relating widespread norm of fencing in to transaction costs of basic package of entitlements). 
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nineteenth-century whaling norms that can be seen as conforming to a simple general rule 
with an exception for special important situations.103  Under the “fast-fish-loose-fish” 
rule, the first harpooner gets the whole whale as long as whale is attached to his boat. 
This rule, which accords with general notions of certain control in first possession, 
applied to right whales, which are relatively slow-moving, and to whales generally, with 
some major exceptions. Under the “iron-holds-the-whale” or “first-iron” rule, the first 
harpooner would get exclusive rights to the whale as long as he was in fresh pursuit, 
which requires more judgment. The first-iron rule tended to be adopted where the very 
valuable but very dangerous sperm whales were predominant.  For finback whales, which 
sink and rise to the surface, the custom was marking with a bomb lance and a small fee to 
finders who were obligated to report beached marked finbacks.104  Ellickson argues that 
these norms confirm his hypothesis that close-knit groups will devise efficient norms 
among themselves (but with the possibility of outgroup externalities, like 
overexploitation).105  But note that the general norm of first possession based on certain 
control is the default rule for whales.106  Simple baselines matter, and they matter because 
of information costs – an important species of transaction costs.  Again, it is the Coase 
Corollary in action.   
Finally, the distinction between in rem and in personam rights, which lies at the 
heart of the traditional property/contract distinction, is likewise a product of transaction 
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104 Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 159-60 (D. Mass. 1881). 
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costs.  In a zero transaction cost world, one could re-describe in rem rights against all the 
world in terms of a congeries of in personam rights, as Hohfeld imagined.107  That is, one 
could cash out the idea of A having a right against all the world as being equivalent to A 
having a right against B, a right against C, a right against D, etc.  This equivalence would 
hold, however, only in the world of the Coase Corollary.  In the real world of positive 
transaction costs, it is prohibitively costly to list everyone in the world in order to 
describe all the persons who are bound by A’s having an right in rem.  Likewise, 
contracting pairwise would be unfeasibly costly.  Instead, it is necessary to solve many 
problems “wholesale” through in rem rights  – including core property rights – which 
impose automatic duties of noninterference on all persons who may or may not encounter 
the owned property, whoever they may be, and whether or not they have any conception 
of who the owner might be.  In our world of positive transaction costs, in rem duties are 
not and cannot be equivalent to an enormously long list of in personam duties.   
By having the right to exclude from some thing, A is given “sovereignty” over a 
range of largely unspecified uses as against a largely unspecified set of dutyholders.  We 
do not deny that many aspects of property differ according to conditions of time, place, 
and culture.  But we would argue that defining property in terms of things as a starting 
point, grouping of uses under exclusion rights, and the widespread employment of in rem 
rights are no accident: they receive a transaction cost explanation.  Establishing starting 
points or baselines in property is not a trivial problem, and for transaction cost reasons 
                                                 
107 Wesley Hohfeld famously analyzed in rem rights as collections of in personam rights, as part of an 
atomizing scheme of legal relations that was quite inspiring to the Legal Realists.  See Wesley Newcomb 
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could not be replicated by contract.  Establishing such baselines is thus, to borrow a 
phrase, an “essential role” of the law of property.108  The need for the baseline 
entitlements to be largely unspecified is a direct result of the Coase Corollary.  Positive 
transaction costs in our world make it advantageous to economize on the costs of 
delineating, understanding, and enforcing entitlements.  Hence the preference for the 
traditional notion of property as opposed to the bundle of rights.  Rather than Coase’s 
atomized picture of property, our positive transaction cost world exhibits the highly 
standardized, truly “Coasean” property familiar from the law of property. 
CONCLUSION 
In this essay, we have sought to make Coasean property more Coeasean.  We 
started by showing what picture of property Coase subscribed to in his pathbreaking 
work.  Coase’s picture of property was an extreme version of the Legal Realist bundle of 
rights.  This highly atomized bundle of rights picture treats property as a collection of 
governmentally-resolved pairwise use conflicts among members of society, with a 
background assumption of symmetry of causation and entitlement allocation.  The bundle 
of rights picture has carried over into Coase-inspired work in law and economics and the 
New Institutional Economics.   
Coase’s picture of property was wholly tangential to the major contributions that 
have flowed from his seminal articles.  The importance of transaction costs in the design 
of legal institutions, the importance of contracting as a device for internalizing 
externalities, the need to engage in comparative institutional analysis in proposing 
solutions to problems of social cost – all these transformative insights could have been 
                                                 
108 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 
393-94 (2000) (arguing that affirmative asset partitioning, protecting the firm’s assets from the owner’s 
creditors, could not be replicated by contract and is therefore the essential role of organizational law). 
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made and their value fully realized without accepting the bundle of rights picture of 
property.    
We have gone further, and have also argued that applying Coasean economic-
institutional analysis to the institution of property itself reveals a Coasean rationale for 
traditional notions of property as an in rem right to a thing.  To this end, we introduced 
the Coase Corollary, which states that in a zero transaction cost world, the nature and 
scope of property is irrelevant to the value of production.  As with the Coase Theorem, 
from which it directly follows, the point of the Coase Corollary is that in our positive 
transaction cost world the nature and scope of property do matter to the allocation of 
resources and the value of production.  The truly Coasean approach is to engage in 
comparative institutional analysis of the notion of property itself.  Here baselines matter, 
and because of positive transaction costs – and in particular, the costs of delineating, 
understanding, and enforcing rights – “entitlements” are built using an in rem exclusion 
strategy to define things and take care of many conflicts wholesale, with refinements 
governing uses through institutions like zoning, nuisance, contracts, and norms.  
Traditional property as defined in law turns out to be quite Coasean after all. 
